The stalemate is the longest and hardest stage of the War of Resistance against Japan.
the stalemate is the longest and hardest stage of the War of Resistance against Japan. From the Japanese aggressors' occupation of Taiyuan, Wuhan, and Guangzhou in 1938 to the eve of the Anti-Japanese War, the frontal battlefield between China and Japan was repeatedly seesaw between Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong and Henan lakes and Guangzhou. During the period of the Japanese army, there were several large-scale attacks. For example, in 1944, Japan launched Operation Plan No. 1 to launch the Henan-Hunan-Guangxi campaign to break through the "mainland communication line." As a result, the Kuomintang army collapsed thousands of miles, and more than 200,000 square kilometers of land fell into the enemy's hands.
but on the battlefield in North China, the Japanese always hovered around Shanxi and did not cross the Yellow River and launched a large-scale attack west of Tongguan. At that time, the main rear area of the Kuomintang was the Yunguichuan area in the southwest. If the Japanese occupied Shaanxi, it would form a situation of sandwiching the northeast on both sides of the southwest rear, which would pose a considerable threat to the persistence of the Anti-Japanese War. The Japanese invaders made three operational plans to seize Shaanxi, then attack Sichuan, and finally perish China, but these plans were all stillborn.
according to this plan, the Japanese army, based on the invading Japanese North China Front Army, will form a fifth front army, with Seishiro Panagaki as commander. Then the army divided into two routes, starting from Hubei and advancing westward along both sides of the Yangtze River. On the other hand, they raided westward from Shanxi, forcibly crossed the Yellow River, captured Yan'an, Xi'an, and Baoji cut off the Hexi Corridor, and then took Hanzhong as the base, crossed the Qinling Bashan Mountains, and occupied northern Sichuan. In the end, the two armies of Lu surrounded Chengdu and Chongqing and eliminated the Chiang Kai-shek regime.
on September 3, 1942, Emperor Hirohito of Japan approved the "Operation five" plan. The Japanese base camp issued the "mainland finger No. 1252" instruction. The Japanese began to rub their hands, sharpen their knives, and prepare for battle. The Japanese army dispatched 30 automobile and boat bridge units from the Pacific battlefield into the North China Front Army and the 11th Army, issued instructions for the deployment of military supplies for two months, and began large-scale river crossing and mountain combat training. Anda 23, chief of staff of the North China Front Army, also personally flew to the sky over the Qinling Bashan Mountain to conduct reconnaissance.
the Japanese abandoned this plan because they found that changes in the situation made it impossible for them to carry out the plan at all.
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first of all, the Japanese army turned offensive to defense on the Pacific battlefield and lost its superiority. In June 1942, the Battle of Midway ended and the Japanese offensive was thwarted. In August 1942, the US military launched the Battle of Guadalcanal, and the Japanese were transferred to passive defense. To regain the initiative, Japan launched three large-scale counter-attacks, but all failed. War situation deterioration disrupted the deployment of the Japanese army to invade China.
secondly, Japan expanded its aggression and its economic burden reached its limit. Japan's military expenditure in 1941 was as high as 12.5 billion yen, accounting for 34.9 percent of the national income of that year. In 1942, after the outbreak of the Pacific War, only military spending from January to June was 1.5 times that of 1941. Economic distress has also brought material shortages, and Japan's steel and oil stocks have fallen sharply, making it difficult to support a large-scale military offensive.
in addition, the international situation has also become disadvantageous to Japan. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the international anti-fascist alliance was established, and the strategic advantage of the axis powers gradually disintegrated. In the second half of 1942, the Nazi German offensive was intercepted and besieged by the Soviets at Stalingrad; in North Africa, Rommel has defeated thousands of miles at the Battle of Alamein. The scale of the war has tilted towards the anti-fascist camp
therefore, this plan has been increasingly strongly opposed and questioned by the Japanese army since it was issued. The Kwantung Army believed that the deployment of troops might lead to the Soviet attack on the Northeast; the Navy thought that the supply of steel against Britain and the United States was too tight to support the plan.
but like the previous Operation Plan 5, this Operation Plan 50 will not work. What the Japs could not do in 1942 could not be done by the Japs in 1943.
first, the Japanese army is insufficient. In the Pacific battlefield, the US military began a cross-island leapfrog attack. Tired of coping, the Japanese army successively transferred the 15th division, the 27 division, the 17th division, the 36 division, and the 32 division from the Chinese battlefield to fight against the United States and Britain. The Chinese Expeditionary Army lacked sufficient troops to carry out the plan to attack Xi'an.
second, the Japanese army is short of materials. Disasters occurred frequently in the enemy-occupied areas of North and Central China in 1942, and the famine was serious in the spring of 1943. As a result of the Pacific War, the Japanese mainland was unable to supply the military supplies of the Chinese Expeditionary Army, so it not only asked the Chinese Expeditionary Army to "provide local self-sufficient materials", but also expected to "ensure that China provided exports to Japan." Therefore, amid the great famine, the devils were also short of food, "there was nothing our army could do about the development of self-sufficient materials and exports to Japan," and the operational plan to attack Xi'an was also restricted.
third, the development and expansion of the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines have contained the Japanese army. 1943 was a year of vigorous development in the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines. This year, the Japanese army deeply felt the "deterioration of law and order" and raided the base areas to clear the countryside, but it was also difficult for the Japanese army to spare the energy to launch large-scale operations on the frontal battlefield.
in 1944, Japan launched "Operation one" and the Henan-Hunan-Guangxi campaign broke out. In June 1944, the Japanese army once went deep into western Henan along the Longhai Railway and occupied Lingbao in Luoyang, which posed a serious threat to Xi'an. In response, Chairman Mao pointed out that "at present, the most serious task is to defend Xi'an, Shaanxi and the northwest." This is the only international channel today, and if it is lost here, it will threaten Sichuan. "
Old Chiang Kai-shek also strictly ordered the defeated troops not to withdraw into Shaanxian County and dispatched the eighth Theater Army to reinforce Lingbao. But the devils only focused on opening up the mainland transportation line running through the north and south, and westward to Shaanxi was not part of the plan. After Lingbao encountered resistance, he turned around and headed south.
Xi'an Battle outline
however, Yasuji Okamura, commander-in-chief of the Chinese Expeditionary Force, does not think so. he believes that it is unlikely that the United States will land from the southeast coast of China, and that the best way to support the decisive battle in Japan is to destroy the Chiang Kai-shek regime in one fell swoop. "determined to overcome all difficulties and attack Sichuan Province in the coming spring, it will deal a decisive blow to Chongqing's troops. Create a good time to have a box alone with the Chongqing regime or to break it out of the war.
Ningji Okamura formulated the outline of the operational Plan for attacking Sichuan and the guidance for Future Operations of the Expeditionary Army and planned to divide the troops into two routes, attack Xi'an all the way, then cross the Qinling Mountains, launch a frontal offensive from Hengyang and Liuzhou to the west, capture Zhejiang and Guiyang, long drive Chengyu, and join forces with the first Route Army.
the stronghold naturally did not accept the opinions of the village of Gang. In January 1945, the war became even tenser, so the stronghold issued "mainland finger 2363" and "Continental order 1228" to the Chinese Expeditionary Army on January 22nd.
capture Shaanxi, and then go south to attack Sichuan. During the Anti-Japanese War, the Japanese army made such a battle plan three times, but there was no way to put it into practice. Among them, the specific reason is that the situation is different, but in the final analysis, it is Japan's lack of material resources and multi-front operations.
as pointed out in "on protracted War": "Japan is a relatively small country, and it lacks human, military, financial and material resources and cannot withstand a long war. The Japanese rulers want to solve this difficult problem from the war, but in the same way, they will achieve the opposite of their expectations.